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Religion, Church, and State in the Post-Communist 
Era: The Case of Ukraine (with Special References to 
Orthodoxy and Human Rights Issues) 
Victor Yelensky∗ 
I. RELIGION, CHURCH, AND STATE IN UKRAINE ON THE EVE OF 
THE FALL OF COMMUNISM 
A. Communist Religious Policy 
Up to the beginning of Gorbachev’s reforms in Ukraine,1 there 
were over six thousand officially functioning religious communities 
(one-third of the religious organizations in the Soviet Union). This 
number included four thousand Orthodox parishes (65% of the reli-
gious communities in Ukraine), more than eleven hundred commu-
nities of Evangelical Christian-Baptists, about one hundred commu-
nities of Roman Catholics, and eighty communities of the Church of 
Reformation of Trans-Carphathian’s Hungarians and others. 
The “Regulations Concerning the Religious Organizations in the 
Ukrainian SSR” defined the legal basis for the activity of religious 
organizations in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.2 This law, 
which mainly reproduced the Stalinist legislation of 1929, was issued 
in 1976. In addition, a great number of special instructions existed 
that led to an even more severe attitude towards churches. The viola-
tion of the minimal set of rights granted to believers was an ordinary 
phenomenon. 
The number of official church institutions in no way reflected the 
real religious needs of the Ukrainian population. The authorities arti-
ficially restrained the increase of church institutions; the Communist 
party and state organizations concentrated their efforts on reducing 
 
 ∗ Victor Yelensky, Ph.D., is a Senior Researcher at the Philosophy Institute of 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and Editor of the Journal for Religious Studies, “Lyudina i 
Svit” (Individual and World). He is also President of the Ukrainian branch of the International 
Religious Liberty Association. 
 1. The Ukraine is a Soviet Republic with a population of fifty-two million. 
 2. Regulations Concerning the Religious Organizations in the Ukrainian SSR (1976). 
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the religious activity of the population, setting up harsh and com-
prehensive control over the church, and limiting the church’s func-
tions to only ritual practice.3 
Most religious communities in Ukraine worked unofficially.4 In 
fact, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church existed underground, 
where despite difficult conditions it managed to preserve its bishops, 
monks, clerics, and continuity of tradition.5 The communities of Je-
hovah’s Witnesses and Reformed Baptists,6 and a significant part of 
the Pentecostal Christians, survived in a similar manner.7 The struc-
tures, parallel to the official ones, occurred in Catholicism, Judaism, 
and many of the Protestant denominations.8 
Moreover, at times during the past twenty years, the populations 
of many cities and villages (mainly in western Ukraine) have peti-
tioned for permission to open Orthodox temples. In 1985, these pe-
titions came from 173 Ukrainian towns; however, none of the peti-
tions were granted. 
At the same time, the Soviet state implemented an extensive anti-
religious propaganda campaign as a part of the political indoctrina-
tion of the people. A solid infrastructure contributed to the effec-
tiveness of this effort. The farther from Moscow and the closer to the 
provinces, the more intensive the propaganda was.9 Disagreements 
about the limitations on churches may have existed between: (a) the 
pragmatically disposed, foreign economic departments, including the 
KGB’s cultural apparatus and (b) the propagandist services and local 
party organizations. Yet, these disagreements were usually solved in 
 
 3. See VICTOR YELENSKY, DERZHAVNO-TSERKOVKI VZAEMINI V. UKRAINE: 1917–
1990 (1991). 
 4. According to one estimate, approximately 1200 unregistered sectarian groups oper-
ated illegally in the Soviet Union in 1985. D. A. Loeber, Church and State, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF SOVIET LAW 103, 104 (F.J.M. Feldbrugge et al. eds., 2d ed. 1985). 
 5. “The Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic Church acknowledges the primacy of the Pope, 
but retains the Eastern (Byzantine) Rite. This church, known as the Uniate Church, lost its 
independence in 1946 when it was re-united under pressure with the Russian Orthodox 
Church in Moscow.” Loeber, supra note 4, at 104. Many Uniates persisted in professing their 
faith, although forced to do so underground. Id. 
 6. The Reformed Baptists broke away from the recognized association, the All-Union 
Council of Baptists, which had been established in 1944. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See, e.g., JAMES THROWER, MARXIST-LENINIST “SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM” AND THE 
STUDY OF RELIGION AND ATHEISM IN THE USSR (1983). 
 9. During the “transitive” regimes of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, 
around one million atheistic lectures were given in the Soviet Union every year. 
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favor of the group that stood for uncompromising limitations of reli-
gious activity and, especially, for manifestation of national and reli-
gious distinctiveness.10 
B. Religiosity in Ukraine Before the Great Transformation 
The achievements of the Ukrainian Communist administration in 
its efforts to substitute some secular ersatz-religion for religiousness 
were much more humble than was officially declared.11 
Unfortunately, no reliable data is available to characterize the re-
ligious identification of the Ukrainian population in the 1970s and 
1980s. Several factors render the sociological research from that pe-
riod unreliable. These factors are: (a) a lack of trustworthy data ac-
cumulated by Soviet sociologists of religion; (b) peculiarities of the 
Marxist-Leninist view of religion, as described sometimes in empiri-
cal material; (c) the self-isolation of Soviet society and inclination of 
many faithful in the Soviet Union, particularly highly-educated per-
sons who held social positions, to anonymously withhold their view-
point, which presumably meant religiousness was higher than re-
ported in this area; (d) subordination of religious studies to 
sociological methods with the aim of overcoming religion; and (e) 
outspoken “understatements” in the interpretation of the existing 
data. Significantly, in one treatise, the authors not only avoided esti-
mating the level of religiousness throughout the Soviet Union, but 
also failed to report on the main results of their research on relig-
ions.12 For instance, according to the results of representative inves-
tigation in Belorussia (ten thousand people were questioned in five 
to six regions of the republic), a detailed study of the social-
demographic structure of what was termed a “religious” contingent 
had been conducted. However, there are no reports pertaining to 
the percentage of believers in this contingent in any of ten thousand 
 
 10. In 1929, the government revoked the right of registered religions to spread “reli-
gious propaganda.” In contrast, the government continued to uphold and employ its freedom 
to “spread atheist propaganda.” See Loeber, supra note 4, at 107 (citing U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 
52 (1977)). This encouragement of atheist propaganda and prohibition of religious propa-
ganda made religious freedom in the Soviet Union  a mere pretense. See id. at 109. 
 11. Nikolay Berdyayev correctly asserted that totalitarianism by itself strives to be a 
church. 
 12. KONKRETNIE ISSLEDOVANIYA SOVREMENNIH RELIGIOZNIH VEROVANIJ: 
METODIKA, ORGANIZATSIYA, REZULTATI 63–83 (Moscow 1967). 
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cases.13 Similarly, the treatise presents another study that had been 
conducted in Sumska, Ternopilska, Ivano-Frankivska, Zakarpatska, 
Chernigivska, and other regions of Ukraine.14 
Based on this evidence, we might assume that these results, ob-
tained in a process of wide-scale investigations, were dissonant with 
the prevailing theoretical scheme—that the Soviet Union was a 
country of “mass atheism.” 
Analyzing the fragments of empirical material that had been ac-
cumulated in a process of concrete-sociological research of religious-
ness in the Soviet Union from the mid 1960s to the beginning of the 
1980s, William Fletcher comes to the conclusion that 45% of the 
population of the Soviet Union were believers. Fletcher also found 
evidence to counter the Russian sociologists’ belief that religion was 
a phenomenon of the past that had been dying at the time of the 
1917 Revolution.15 Nevertheless, as Fletcher points out, the men-
tioned index is only an “average.” For the regions with an absolute 
predomination of Russians, it is high; but for the areas where Islam is 
widespread, as well as for Lithuania and western Ukraine, it is low.16 
The outline of arguments proposed by Fletcher seems to be 
somewhat theoretical and abstract (mainly due to the limited empiri-
cal data that was available). Nonetheless, Fletcher’s conclusions ap-
pear to be much more realistic than official declarations, such as the 
statement that the vast majority of Soviet people are neither influ-
enced by nor members of any religion.17 
Secret reports, submitted by party officials, reveal that in 1985, 
the first year of Gorbachev’s reforms, 26% of newborns were bap-
tized. Nearly 3% consecrated their marriage in a church, and over 
40% of the dead were buried with a church’s assistance. Notably, the 
figures on baptism and funerals performed by the Catholic Church in 
the Netherlands that same year did not essentially differ from the 
figures in Ukraine.18 Undoubtedly, the Ukrainian figures are seri-
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. WILLIAM C. FLETCHER, SOVIET BELIEVERS: THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR OF THE 
POPULATION 14–15, 211–13 (1981). 
 16. See id. at 69–70. 
 17. See id. at 211–13. 
 18. See Lilian Voyé & Karel Dobbelaere, Roman Catholicism: Universalism at Stake, in 
RELIGIONS SANS FRONTIERES? PRESENT AND FUTURE TRENDS OF MIGRATION, CULTURE, 
AND COMMUNICATION 83, 92 (Roberto Cipriani ed., 1993). 
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ously underestimated. They do not include baptisms and funerals 
conducted by underground religious institutions, by clergymen in 
private, or by those not registered in a special book. In the big cities, 
these practices were common. 
C. Church and Society 
During the period of Brezhnev’s stagnation, religion was firmly 
considered by the thinking public as an alternative system of values 
that could uncompromisingly withstand the official ideology and 
slogans, the untenability of which became more and more obvious. 
Noticing the increase of adult baptism, the obsession of the intelli-
gentsia with religious literature, the growing popularity of religious 
broadcasting of foreign radio stations, and the outspoken neglect to 
the atheistic propaganda and other materials, party officials expressed 
anxiety over the anti-Communist trend of the spiritual processes in 
the country. 
The church, apart from being the mystical body of Christ (i.e., 
the Eternal Church), was also a social institution that could not re-
main aloof from and indifferent to the effects of social development. 
From a sociological perspective, the existence of religious organiza-
tions in the former Soviet bloc countries required maintaining a dif-
ficult confrontational position vis-à-vis the state. In this relationship, 
the church needed to fight to preserve its “independence.”19 The 
church also had to face the very real problem of its future existence. 
Essentially, the church was forcibly removed from the sphere of so-
cial service; this action, according to church leaders, was a matter of 
principle. 
The church had no right to engage in missionary work or in 
evangelism. It could not even take care of the poor or act as a spiri-
tual guide for people. Consequently, its status as an impotent institu-
tion was crystallized. 
Under these conditions, it is unlikely that religious institutions in 
post-Communist countries on the whole, and in Ukraine in particu-
lar, would be able to develop a synthetic religious point of view con-
cerning church activity in the post-totalitarian landscape. These reli-
gious institutions were probably not capable of immediately finding 
adequate answers to the challenges posed by society. Weakened reli-
 
 19. In fact, the church has been fighting to secure its independence for nearly 2000 
years. 
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gious institutions had to deal with a barrage of contradictions—a 
barrage initiated by the repressive Soviet regime. 
After the fall of the Communist regime, a conflict that may be 
described as a “conflict of anticipations” soon appeared. Caused by a 
difference between the expectations placed upon the church after the 
fall of the Communist regime and the actual social and cultural 
potential of the church and its clergy, this “conflict of anticipations” 
lasted only during the 1990s. 
II. RELIGION, RELIGIOSITY, AND CHURCHES IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE 
A. The Institutional Religion 
The real changes in the religious situation in Ukraine started in 
mid-1988, the year of the thousandth anniversary of Rus’s baptism. 
Beginning in mid-1988, “the new way of thinking” of the Kremlin 
finally affected the sphere of church-state relations. During Gorba-
chev’s first years in power, legal and secret restrictions on religious 
practices were somewhat relaxed, and by 1989, all religious prisoners 
and deportees were allowed to return home. Among those released 
were a number of Uniate priests and religious freedom defenders. 
In August 1987, a group of bold Greek Catholic clergymen and 
lay activists declared their emergence from the underground and ap-
pealed to Pope John Paul II for help in the restoration of the 
church’s rights. In October 1989, a large Orthodox parish in Lviv 
declared itself to be of the Uniate faith. Hundreds of other churches 
followed suit. In November 1989, the Ukrainian Council for Reli-
gious Affairs offered to allow registration of individual congregations 
of Uniates. A few days later, the Pope met President Gorbachev in 
the Vatican. 
Beginning in 1989, hundreds20 of Russian Orthodox Church 
parishes (mostly in western Ukraine) declared themselves as belong-
ing to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (“UAOC”).21 
 
 20. Orest Subtelny estimates that approximately 1650 parishes had defected from the 
Russian Orthodox Church to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church (“UAOC”) by June 1990. 
OREST SUBTELNY, UKRAINE: A HISTORY 579 (2d ed. 1994). 
 21. UAOC had not had a presence in Ukraine since the 1930s and had been based 
abroad. When the UAOC re-emerged in 1990, it began to compete “for Orthodox loyalties.” 
Id. at 578–79.  
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At its All-Ukrainian Council in Kiev in June 1990, the UAOC pro-
claimed itself a Patriarchate and elected as its first patriarch ninety-
two-year-old Mstyslav Skrypnyk, the head of the UAOC in the 
West.22 Skrypnyk was the only surviving hierarch from the “second” 
UAOC, which dated back to World War II.23 
From 1988 to 1990, there was a mass opening of formerly closed 
temples, monasteries, and ecclesiastical schools. The number of reli-
gious communities increased an average of 32% every year during 
that period. In 1990, the growth rate was 30%, which decreased each 
year until 1997: 1992—less than 8%; 1993—6.5%; 1994—5.5%; 
1995—6.6%; 1996–1997—less than 5%. By 2001, one religious 
community in Ukraine corresponded to nearly two thousand inhabi-
tants; this number is higher, however, than in neighboring countries 
that formerly were the part of the Soviet Union. 
Over half of the religious communities in Ukraine are Orthodox, 
20% are Greek-Catholic, and the other 20% are Protestants of various 
trends. Although Protestant churches make up a large percentage of 
the total number of churches, those who attend protestant churches 
add up to a small percentage of the total number of church-going 
Ukrainians. Of the respondents who consider themselves religious, 
72.0% belong to Orthodox Churches, 17.0% belong to the Greek 
Catholic Church, 5.3% belong to Muslim communities, 2.2% belong 
to different Protestant congregations, 1.6% belong to the Roman 
Catholic Church, and approximately 1.2% do not belong to any reli-
gious group. Approximately half of the religious communities in 
Ukraine are located in the seven western Ukrainian regions. Notably, 
these regions are inhabited by only 18% of the whole population of 
the country. Before World War II, these territories (slightly more 
than 18% of the area of Ukraine with its present borders), were out-
side of Soviet Union’s boundaries. In this region, the older genera-
tion managed to obtain more or less satisfactory religious instruction 
and the Soviet transformation was conducted without the degree of 
brutal eradication of religious institutions that occurred in the Soviet 
Ukraine. Thus, the church preserved the functions of social commu-
nication, ethnic identification, and moral arbitration. In eastern and 
southern Ukraine, the church practically lost these functions. 
 
 22. See id. at 579. 
 23. The “first” UAOC was the ecclesiastical body that proclaimed itself independent 
from the Moscow Patriarchate in October 1921 and was forced underground by the Soviet 
regime in the 1930s. 
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The difference between the levels of religious culture in western 
Ukraine and eastern Ukraine is essential. The level of declaration of 
religiousness in western Ukraine, particularly in the three regions of 
Eastern Galicia, where the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church domi-
nates, is 3 to 3.5 times higher than in eastern Ukraine. For instance, 
in the Ternopilska region, in western Ukraine, there is one religious 
community per each 688 inhabitants; in Khakiv, in eastern Ukraine, 
there is one religious community per each 4880 inhabitants. 
B. The Level of Religiosity 
The number of Ukrainians who declare themselves to be reli-
gious is increasing rather quickly: in 1997, 64% of those questioned 
declared themselves to be religious.24 The level of confessional iden-
tification is quite high too; the percentage of those who consider 
themselves believers but do not identify themselves with any reli-
gious institution is 3% or less. The portion of people who attend 
church services regularly (i.e., more often than once a month) is 
19%; this figure places Ukraine approximately into the middle of the 
Central-Eastern European pyramid, behind Catholic Hungary, but 
ahead of the Czech Republic, eastern Germany, Latvia, and Esto-
nia.25 
However, the church’s role in post-Communist Ukraine seems 
to be rather paradoxical. On one hand, up to 75% of the Ukrainian 
population trust the church more than any other social institution. 
Neither the president, the government, the parliament, nor the army 
can compete with the church on the subject of trust in public opin-
ion polls. Based on the powerful impulse of social “advancement” 
given to the church in the 1980s, there was a hope that numerous 
problems, unsolvable by official institutions, would be solved by un-
official institutions. The most structured of the unofficial institutions 
were religious organizations. 
The number of respondents stating that religion was helpful for 
society essentially exceeded the number that considered religion as 
beneficial for them personally. But the church often appears to be 
unable to provide actual support of political projects by means of its 
 
 24. See Survey, Democratic Initiatives Foundations, at http://www.ukma.kiev.ua/ 
pub/DI/di.htm. 
 25. Cf. PAUL M. ZULEHNER, KIRCHEN IM UBERGANG IN FREIHEITLICHE 
GESELLSCHAFTEN 31 (1994). 
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own believers. And this is true not only in Ukraine, but also in many 
other post-Communist countries. 
III. THE UKRAINIAN CHURCHES AND POST-COMMUNIST 
CHALLENGES 
A. The Rural Background of Ukrainian Religious Life 
A fundamental fact to remember is that the Ukrainian culture has 
always been essentially, if not mostly, a rural culture. The social 
structure of Ukrainian society ironically has been defined as consist-
ing of “a priest and a peasant.” Furthermore, neighboring political 
and cultural centers influenced the Ukrainian aristocracy; as a result, 
these centers were “Polonized” or “Russianized.” The return to the 
cultural roots of one’s ancestors, like the return made by the future 
Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytski, was the exception to the rule.26 
Within quite a short time—approximately forty years—Ukraine 
has transformed from an almost completely rural nation into a nation 
that is mainly urbanized (in 1998, there were seven cities in Ukraine 
with populations of more than one million each). The Stalinist in-
dustrialization, which began after World War II, consisted of the 
merciless house-breaking and suppression of peasants, the physical 
extermination of peasants, and the peasants’ permanent exodus from 
ruined villages. These events destroyed the traditional Ukrainian cul-
tural archetype drastically—so drastically, in fact, that the preserva-
tion in such circumstances of surviving elements of traditional reli-
gious culture can be regarded as a manifestation of the high viability 
of Ukrainian ethos. 
B. Post-Communist Challenges 
The dramatic migration of people from the fields to the cities has 
resulted in the development of a specific type of religious culture in 
 
 26. Metropolitan Sheptytskyi came from an aristocratic Polish-Ukrainian family that had 
become Polonized (in the male line of descent) at least a century before his birth. His maternal 
grandfather was a well-known Polish playwright, Count Alexander Fredro, whose family was 
Catholic of the Roman rite. Thus, Sheptytskyi’s decision in favor of the nationality of his fore-
fathers and his transfer to the Eastern (Greek) culture came as a shock, first to his family, then 
to Polish society. See Ryszard Torzecki, Sheptyts’kyi and Polish Society, in MORALITY AND 
REALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS’KYI 75–98 (Paul Robert Magocsi &  
Andrii Krawchuk eds., 1989). 
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Ukrainian cities. This religious culture, metaphorically speaking, 
could hardly be translated into language that is common for the con-
temporary megapolis. This incongruity between traditional religious 
culture and city life became especially obvious when the historical 
churches of Ukraine began to severely compete with Protestant 
churches and missions of Western origin. While the traditional 
churches of Ukraine exhausted themselves trying to withstand the 
Soviet regime, these traditional churches also tried to preserve their 
own tradition. Very often, a new social or political development 
meant for these churches a return to the pre-Soviet status quo. How-
ever, not only seven decades, but the entire twentieth century had 
passed. During that time, the Second Vatican Council took place, 
there were breakthroughs in Protestant theology, and the post-
Osvenzym and post-Gulag theologies held significant influence. All 
of this changed the traditional churches as compared to their state in 
the pre-Soviet era. In addition, there were achievements in the 
evangelization of “Homo urbanus,” which were made by the Or-
thodox and Greek-Catholic Churches. 
The dissatisfaction of Orthodox and Greek-Catholic believers–
dissatisfaction with the intensity of religious life and with the role of 
religious communities in satisfying social and cultural needs—was 
most strongly revealed in the cities. It is apparent that the elevated 
level of dissatisfaction results from the way religion is communicated 
in the city, where immediate contact is replaced with indirect com-
munication with ever-increasing frequency. 
As a result, the development of neo-Protestant trends in cities 
appears to be more dynamic than the development of historical 
trends. In the cities, Protestant institutions developed effective mis-
sionary operations, which depended on mobile missionary groups 
that have experience and great financial potential. Suffice it to say 
that only 29% of all missions operating today in Ukraine were 
founded by Orthodox and Catholics; the others were founded by 
Protestants. In many big cities, Protestant communities are begin-
ning to outnumber Orthodox ones. 
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IV. THE POSITION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 
A. The Religious Minorities Under the Soviet Regime 
Although it varied over time, the Soviet regime’s attitude toward 
minority religions was determined by the Soviet regime’s general ap-
proach to religion and religious institutions. During the Lenin pe-
riod, religious minorities were considered a serious counterbalance to 
the Russian Orthodox Church, which was an integrated element of 
the tsarist regime and, consequently, represented a special danger to 
the Bolsheviks. During the years of the Stalinist terror, religious mi-
norities were persecuted with the same ferocity as the Orthodox 
Church. Yet by the time Stalin’s so-called National Economic Policy 
(“NEP”) connected with the constitutionalization of the Stalin em-
pire with “the main people,” the situation had changed. The Russian 
Orthodox Church was integrated into the ideological state device. 
Thus, loyalty of religious minorities to the state became the subject 
of suspicion, and pressure on religious minorities grew. 
During the Brezhnev period, the attitude of the regime to reli-
gious minorities was formed through interaction of the following 
factors: 
 
1. The state’s attempts to prevent the formation of a union of 
ethnic minorities dedicated to national liberation and based upon re-
ligious feelings and institutions; 
2. The necessity of maintaining, for the sake of the West, a fa-
cade of observance of human rights and freedoms for religious mi-
norities based on the notion that the West used these issues as an in-
strument of pressure against the Soviet Union; and 
3. The desire to restrict religious activity that eventually was a 
danger to the Soviet system. Notably, religious minorities were the 
group that demonstrated the most significant resistance to the re-
gime and achieved prominent successes in dissemination of their be-
liefs and defense of their religious dignity. 
 
Finally, during his visit to Poland, Mikhail Gorbachev recognized 
that “we, the communists, did a great deal of damage with respect to 
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the Church.”27 It was the first recognition by a figure in the Soviet 
hierarchy of the absurdity inherent in the Soviet model of church-
state relations. Four years later, while summarizing the results of his 
reforms, the first and last Soviet Union president, in spite of the em-
barrassment caused by attacks from his enemies and former com-
rades, still had a right to conclude that religious freedom in the So-
viet Union had become a reality. 
The liberalization process in Ukraine dragged behind that in 
Moscow. The old Communist party elite that severely administered 
the situation in the country blocked the way for a majority of the in-
novations in Gorbachev’s spirit “of new thinking.” By the end of 
1988 and the beginning of 1989, the Communist leadership of 
Ukraine embodied the last group who had yet to retreat from the or-
thodox Stalinist views on religious freedom. This last group encour-
aged the “establishing of special relations” and union with the hier-
archy of the Ukrainian exarchate of the Russian Orthodox church in 
the struggle with “anticommunism and nationalism.” At the same 
time, this group sought strict prohibition against the revival of the 
prohibited Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and Ukrainian Auto-
cephalous Orthodox Church. 
According to the plan of the creators of this last edition of the 
church-state relations model in the Soviet Ukraine, religious minori-
ties had to observe a favorable neutrality toward the regime in this 
struggle. This neutrality was supposed to be brought about by giving 
more freedom to religious minorities while canceling numerous re-
strictive regulations adopted previously during the time of 
Khruschev’s anti-religious policies of the 1950s–1960s. 
The struggle of the new regime with the Ukrainian Catholics and 
the regime’s struggle against the movement for independence of the 
Ukrainian Orthodoxy from the Moscow Patriarchy created opportu-
nities for religious minorities in Ukraine to restore their institutional 
structure, to establish close relations with coreligionists abroad, and 
to develop missionary activity. 
B. Religious Minorities in Contemporary Ukraine 
Many experts predicted in the second half of the 1980s that the 
growth of nationalism and the struggle for national identity in 
 
 27. Mikhail Gorbachev, Meeting with Representatives of Polish Intelligentsia (1988). 
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Ukraine would be followed immediately by especially strong persecu-
tion of religious and ethnic minorities. A decade later, one can assert 
that the transition period in Ukraine turned out to be more compli-
cated than in many other post-Communist countries. But there is 
something quite different as well; namely, in Ukraine, religious and 
ethnic minorities feel far more comfortable than their partners in the 
majority of other eastern European countries. 
A sufficiently complicated and interconnected network of factors 
contributed to the current situation. The most significant among 
them may be arranged in five groups. 
1. Religious configuration in Ukraine 
Several centers of religious power exist in the Ukraine. This fact 
prevents any one of these power centers from dominating over reli-
gious minorities or from conducting repressive or even restrictive 
policy toward them. These power centers function as rivals, address-
ing their own sector of public opinion and their own corresponding 
circles of political elite. They create a kind of balance that prevents 
the establishment of a religious institution that would dominate su-
premely over others and with which one might identify (de facto if 
not de jure) the Ukrainian state. As Bohdan R. Bociurkiw wrote, 
[t]he overall religious picture of contemporary Ukraine is that of 
religious pluralism more publicly tolerated than in Russia. This 
challenges the traditional view of Ukraine as an Orthodox-Uniate 
Country. It reflects . . . the more complicated ethnic composition 
of Ukraine—a product of both forcible transfers of various nation-
alities and greater demographic mobility.28 
2. Ukraine’s liberal church-state legislation 
This legislative model has defects typical for the post-Soviet 
countries. However, with the exemption of the Amendment to the 
Article 24 of the Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations,” this model is extremely favorable for religious mi-
norities.29 
 
 28. Bohdan Bociurkiw, Politics and Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox and the Greek 
Catholics, in THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 131, 
152 (Michael Bourdeaux ed., 1995). 
 29. UKR. CONST. ch. 2, art. 24 (1996). 
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3. The special position of ethnic minorities 
Two ethnic groups, Jews and Muslims, are significant because 
they are the largest ethnic minorities in Ukraine for which religion is 
a core part of their ethnic identity. The Jewish community consists of 
about one-half million, and the community of Crimean Tatars con-
sists of almost 300,000 members. These two communities are con-
sidered important allies in strengthening Ukrainian statehood, and 
they are in fact such allies. With the exception of some extremists, 
the Ukrainian dissidents in the Brezhnev era considered the Jewish 
and Crimean-Tatar right-defenders as comrades in the anti-imperial 
struggle. After Ukraine attained its independence, many Ukrainian 
dissidents occupied important positions in society. Ukrainian history 
is indebted to them for the opportunity to overturn at the end of the 
twentieth century the universality of the bitter statement by the great 
Jewish historian Shimon Dubnow, who wrote: “The experience has 
proved that any explosion of the national passions among any people 
first of all aggravates the attitude of this same people to the Jews liv-
ing among them.”30 
4. Tolerance towards other faiths 
The Ukrainian Orthodoxy’s tradition of a sufficiently tolerant at-
titude towards the adherents of other faiths is an important distinc-
tion between Ukrainian and Moscow Orthodoxy. After the Kiev 
metropoly became connected with the Moscow Patriarchy in the 
seventeenth century, this tolerance of other faiths, openness to West-
ern ideas, and freedom to communicate with non-Orthodox groups 
brought on the severe criticism of the Moscow hierarchy against the 
Kiev priesthood. 
5. Historical influence 
Finally, it is evident that predictions concerning possible future 
development of interreligious and interethnical processes in Ukraine 
after attaining state independence were constructed in many cases 
under the influence of historical reminiscences of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries rather than on the basis of the social-
political and social-psychological analysis of the Ukrainian situation. 
 
 30. SIMON DUBNOV & BENZION DINUR, TWO CONCEPTS OF THE REBIRTH OF ISRAEL 
101 (1990). 
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C. The Religious Minorities in Public Opinion 
According to a 2001 poll, more than 66% of the adult popula-
tion in Ukraine declared their religiosity. Among this number, more 
than 70% considered themselves Orthodox believers and nearly 17% 
considered themselves Eastern Rites Catholics. The correlation be-
tween religious activity and awareness of religious doctrine, on the 
one hand, and the critical attitude to the precepts of other faiths, on 
the other hand, is doubtless. At the same time, one can describe the 
attitude of the population at large toward religious and ethnic mi-
norities as being tolerant rather than hostile. Thus, for example, ac-
cording to the Socis-Gallup Poll, 33% of respondents preferred to 
live in a society where religious and ethnic minorities must restrict 
their claims and adjust to the majority of citizens. At the same time, 
41% of respondents did not wish to live in such a society and 25% 
did not declare their preference. It is of interest that in Galychyna—
the three regions of the western Ukraine justifiably considered to be 
the bastion of Ukrainian nationalism—those who thought that mi-
norities should restrict their claims were only 19% of the population. 
In Crimea, where the Russian majority painfully observed the return 
of the Crimean Tatars to their historical homeland, 61% thought that 
minorities should restrict their claims. At the same time, activity of 
foreign missions caused a rather critical reaction in public opinion. 
Only 7.2% of the Kievites questioned by the Ukrainian Sociology 
Service in 1997 supported activity of foreign missions; 38.7% were 
indifferent to missionary activity, and 17.6% were of the opinion that 
such activity must be prohibited completely. 
D. The Established Churches and Religious Minorities 
As a rule, the hierarchy of the Orthodox churches abstains from 
criticizing religious minorities that are traditional for Ukraine, such 
as Jews, Muslims, Reformists, Baptists, and Pentecostals. At the same 
time, Orthodox hierarchs sharply criticize the activity of the Roman 
Catholic Church in Ukraine, accusing it of proselytizing and expand-
ing on the east. Even though the Catholic community in Ukraine (of 
the Latin and Eastern rites together) is the largest among the coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union, the Orthodox hierarchs under the 
jurisdiction of Moscow Patriarchate alone managed until now to 
block the visit of Pope John Paul II to Ukraine and the opening of 
the Ukrainian embassy in the Holy See. 
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The Orthodox churches and the Greek-Catholic church demon-
strate a most hostile attitude to the foreign religious missions and 
new religious movements (“NRM”). In fact, the ambition to put 
aside these rivals became one of the most important goals of the 
church administrations. The church hierarchs appeal constantly to 
the public, to the local authorities, and to the Ukrainian government 
for protection against foreign missionaries and the NRM. 
The Orthodox hierarchs brought forward demands of this kind 
during meetings of the religious leaders with President L. Kravchuk 
in June 1994, with President L. Kuchma in July 1994 and in March 
1996, and with the Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament, O. 
Moroz, in December 1994. 
E. The Problem of the Orthodox-Jewish Dialogue 
The core problem with dialogue in Ukraine between Jews and 
Orthodox believers (“Orthodox-Jewish dialogue”) is that such dia-
logue essentially does not exist. In the post-Soviet history of dia-
logue between Orthodox believers and Jewish believers, the most 
prominent event was perhaps the address of the Moscow Patriarch 
Alexiy II, whose jurisdiction includes 70% of the Orthodox Ukrain-
ian parishes, before the representatives of the Jewish community of 
New York. The head of the Russian Orthodox church did not pro-
pose any new approaches in the framework for eliminating antago-
nism between Orthodoxy and Judaism. The Patriarch made refer-
ences to the ideas of famous hierarchs of the last century. The 
Patriarch restated the brilliant thesis that “[w]e [the Orthodox] are 
separated from Jews because we are ‘not yet fully Christians,’ and 
they . . . are separated from us because they are ‘not fully Jews.’”31 In 
other words, the cause of the resentment of the Orthodox funda-
mentalists was simply their unwillingness to progress beyond the Or-
thodox-Jewish dialogue of more than a century ago. It was an excel-
lent test to verify the health of the church organism. This test has 
demonstrated that the organism is not quite healthy, even if there are 
no other indications of its ailment. 
One of the predominant sources of anti-Semitism in Ukraine 
 
 31. Patriarch Aleksi II, Your Prophets Are Our Prophets, in CHRISTIANITY AFTER 
COMMUNISM: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL STRUGGLE IN RUSSIA 103, 103–06 (Niels 
C. Nielsen, Jr. ed., 1994). This thesis was originally proffered by Nikanor Brovkovitch, the 
nineteenth century Herson and Odessa Archbishop. 
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may not be domestic anti-Semitism. Even the anti-Semitism of the 
intellectuals may not be the most fruitful source because none of the 
influential political forces in Ukraine raise the standard of anti-
Semitism. However, the anti-Semitism of theologians may really be-
come a serious problem. Today the anti-Semitism of theologians is 
free from its extreme manifestations and does not charge the entire 
Jewish people with the murder of Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, the atti-
tude of Orthodox believers to Jews still rests on the old premise that 
the Old and New Testament are contradistinguished. The salvation 
of Jews is not annihilated, but it is postponed. The Judaism of Jesus 
Christ has value only as a precursor of Christianity; after Jesus Christ, 
Judaism loses all its value. Such an approach negates any self-
sufficiency of Judaism, eliminates the uniqueness of Judaism’s spiri-
tual experience, and disallows the competent status of Judaism in the 
dialogue. Thus, the problem of the Orthodox-Jewish dialogue, and 
even of the broader Christian-Jewish dialogue, is the problem of 
each partner in the dialogue renouncing possession of the universal 
truth. 
F. The State Versus Foreign Missionaries and the NRM 
Towards the end of 1993, the government in Kiev began to take 
a more severe attitude toward foreign missions, the communities cre-
ated by them, and the NRM. This severe attitude developed because 
the state authority experienced pressure from the hierarchs of the 
historical churches, from the mass media, and from the anticult 
movement that became considerably stronger during the trial of the 
leaders of the White Brotherhood. The political position of the gov-
ernment also proved to be a factor. In December 1993, the Ukrain-
ian Parliament adopted the Amendment to Article 24 of the Law on 
“Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” that was di-
rected against foreign missionary activity. (This amendment is dis-
cussed in more detail below.) During the years that followed, state-
ments of officials revealed the strengthening of the movement 
against so-called totalitarian destructive sects and missionaries from 
abroad. During celebrations of the fifth anniversary of Ukraine’s in-
dependence, President L. Kuchma spoke openly against the “build-
up of the active foreign missionary organizations in the Ukrainian re-
ligious space.”32 
 
 32. See RABOCHAYA GAZETA (WORKING NEWSPAPER) (Kiev), Aug. 28, 1996. 
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The activity of foreign missionaries in Ukraine as well as in other 
post-Soviet countries was not always flawless. The president of the 
Slavic Gospel Association, Peter Deineka, admits: “The hostile reac-
tion on the Western missions is often caused by the doubtful actions 
of separate missionaries. Some Western missions committed morally 
doubtful or harmful actions [including], for example, attack on the 
Orthodox Church.”33 At the same time, one can easily understand 
the desire of the Ukrainian political elite to use the myth of “the 
sect’s danger.” Under the conditions of this many-sided and 
exhausting interchurch conflict, this “danger” operated as an 
external factor in reconciling competing church institutions. 
Recently, the pro-government mass media and the leftist press 
have clamored against “sects.” After part of the 50,000 faithful of 
the Charismatic community supported the opposition party, led by 
former Prime Minister of Ukraine, Pavlo Lazarenko, the problem of 
“sects” became the central point of the political struggle. The activ-
ity of the Charismatic community, as reported by the opposition 
press, was even discussed at a session of the National Security Coun-
cil. 
V. CHURCH, STATE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
The making of a new system of church-state relations in Ukraine 
proceeded against the background of the most severe economical cri-
sis, a sharp political struggle, and the manifestation of previously la-
tent, interchurch conflicts. 
A. The Interchurch Conflicts 
First, the legalization of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church 
created a new reality in Ukrainian religious life. This church of al-
most five million members had been the catacomb church and was 
considerably decimated, but not completely annihilated, by the 
Communist regime. Legalization of this church was not recognized 
by the Orthodox hierarchy and believers. As a result, a severe strug-
gle between Orthodox and Greek-Catholic powers arose in western 
Ukraine over which church would have a hold on the believers and  
 
 
 33. MARK SMIRNOV & GEORGIJ AVVAKUMOV, RELIGION UND GESELLSHAFT IM 
POSTSOVJETISCHEN RAUM 106 (1996). 
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achieve the dominant position in the parceling of church buildings 
and property.34 
This struggle, which was accompanied by a physical fray between 
believers of the conflicting churches in the early 1990s, has already 
passed the most serious stage of its development but is still far from 
being fully reconciled. 
The problems of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine are, in large 
part, a reflection of the Ukrainian historical drama or, at the least, 
adequate reflections of the political and cultural contradictions in 
Ukrainian society and the conflict of different identities and different 
models of historical memory. The idea of separation from Moscow 
Patriarchate has existed from the very beginning, when the Kiev 
Metropolia was transmitted to Moscow Patriarchate from Constan-
tinople Patriarchate in 1686. This idea was not entirely obliterated 
during the next three hundred years during the existence of the Kiev 
Metropolia as part of the Russian Orthodox Church; unassimilated 
elements of the idea were always present. On the other hand, histori-
cal interpretations of Ukrainian Orthodoxy—that the Russian 
Church is something external and alien to the Orthodox Church in 
Ukraine—certainly do not take historical facts into consideration. 
It is clear that in the eighteenth century Kiev had a great influ-
ence on the formation of the Russian Orthodoxy personality, which 
is considered important by some theologians and historians. At the 
same time, it is obvious that historians have no right to consider the 
opposite influence based only on the facts of the russification of 
Ukraine with the help of the Orthodox Church. 
In the twentieth century, the movement for Ukrainian independ-
ence occurred simultaneously with the movement for the independ-
ence of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Ultimately, while part of 
the Orthodox people considered this independence to be a self-
sufficient value, the rest of the Orthodox people did not view inde-
pendence in the same way. 
The reappearance on Europe’s political map of several newly in-
dependent states at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s led the Orthodox churches in these countries to seek inde-
pendence or to change their jurisdiction. This desire has met strong 
 
 34. See R.G. Weakland, Crisis in Orthodox-Catholic Relations: Challenges and Hopes, in 
166 AMERICA, no. 2.; Serge Keleher, Out of the Catacombs: The Greek-Catholic Church in 
Ukraine, in 19 RELIGION IN COMMUNIST LANDS 251, 251–63 (1991); J. Erickson, A New 
Crisis in Catholic Orthodox Dialogue, in 27 ECUMENISM, no. 107 (1992). 
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resistance from some Orthodox capitals and has resulted in the out-
break of nationalistic intolerance. New zones of contradiction 
emerged in Europe. The situation has been further aggravated with 
the involvement of state resources and the recognition of this situa-
tion’s relevance to international relations (as in Ukraine, Estonia, 
Moldova, and Macedonia). 
But the Orthodoxy in Ukraine happened to be in the most dra-
matic condition. In Ukraine, three Orthodox Churches exist: (1) 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Partiarchate (“UOCMP”), 
which has more than 9500 parishes, 8000 priests, 131 monasteries 
with 3700 monks and nuns, and 15 theological institutions with 
4100 students; (2) Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate 
(“UOCKP”), which is headed by Patriarch Filaret and is anathema-
tized by the Russian Church and has 3050 parishes, 2400 priests, 28 
monasteries, and 15 theological schools with 1600 students; and (3) 
UAOC, which is seeking to be under the jurisdiction of the 
Constantinople Patriarchate, and has more than 1050 parishes, 3 
monasteries, and 8 theological schools. 
Orthodox congregations make up 53% of all religious organiza-
tions with registered charters. In this sense, Ukraine cannot be re-
garded as entirely Orthodox. Approximately 8% to 9% of adults be-
long to the Roman and Greek Catholic churches; the membership of 
Protestant denominations who were baptized and recorded in the 
Church books numbers about one million. 
However, more than half of all respondents surveyed declared 
that they belonged to the Orthodox church. Surprisingly, most of 
them do not belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox church of Moscow 
Patriarchate, but rather they belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church of Kiev Patriarchate. 
From 25% to 32% of those surveyed declared that they belonged 
to the UOCKP, from 7% to 12% declared that they belonged to the 
UOCMP, and from 0.5% to 2% declared that they belonged to the 
UAOC. For those who are acquainted with the realities of Ukrainian 
religious life, there can only be one explanation for these results. By 
declaring that he or she belongs to the Kiev and not to the Moscow 
Patriarchate, a person declares his or her identity with a Ukrainian 
vector. Furthermore, most respondents are nominal Christians—
“nonpracticing” and, sometimes “nonbelieving,” Orthodox mem-
bers. 
On the other hand, the research indicated that 12.2% of the Do-
YEL-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:27 PM 
453] Religion, Church, and State in the Post-Communist Era 
 473 
netsk region’s population and 35.3% of Simferopol’s population be-
long to the Russian Orthodox Church. Yet in Donetsk, at least offi-
cially, there is no such church and, in Simferopol, less than ten such 
churches exist compared with three hundred congregations of 
UOCMP. Clearly, these results are a demonstration of Russian iden-
tity in these regions. 
Where the survey form allowed the choice “an Orthodox who 
did not determine his position regarding the denomination,” (as 
proposed by SOCIS-Gallup-Ukraine service in 1997) 40% of the re-
spondents in some regions chose this response. 
Obviously, at least in three post-Soviet republics—Russia, 
Ukraine, and especially in Belorussia—there are people who deal 
with real difficulties in the sense of their identity. They do not feel 
that they are “Soviet people” because of their political convictions, 
but they cannot equate themselves with any one ethnic commonal-
ity—Ukrainian, Russian, or Belorussian. The survey of public opin-
ion done in 2000 in Ukraine showed that 39% of those surveyed 
identified themselves first of all according to the place where they 
live (region, city, village); 35% identified themselves with Ukraine; 
10% still consider themselves as Soviet people; and only 2% consider 
themselves as belonging to Europe. 
Once more, the conflict among Orthodox churches themselves, 
which is, more or less, an adequate reflection of (a) the social, politi-
cal, and cultural contradictions of Ukrainian society and (b) the dis-
tinctions in the levels of national self-realization, seems to be even 
more dramatic. The basis of this conflict is the different attitudes 
about the sovereignty and independence that the Ukrainian Ortho-
dox Church has obtained from the Moscow Patriarchate. The Ecu-
menical Patriarchate and other local Orthodox churches now recog-
nize only one Ukrainian Orthodox Church—the one under the 
Moscow jurisdiction. Both the Ukrainian Authocephalous Orthodox 
Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are labeled by Moscow 
Patriarchate as “heretic splits.” However, having proclaimed the en-
tire territory of the former Soviet Union as “canonical territory” of 
the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox Church has found 
itself in a state of “canonical war,” not only with Ukrainian Ortho-
dox churches but also with the Constantinople and Romanian Or-
thodox churches. The subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate is 
completely unjustifiable and offensive for one part of the Orthodox  
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believers while the other part considers such a subordination to be a 
quite normal phenomenon. 
As of mid-1999, conflicts among the Ukrainian Orthodox 
churches and conflicts between the Ukrainian Orthodox churches 
and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church were registered in 350 
population points (populated localities) in Ukraine. One obstacle to 
the regulation of these conflicts is the transient nature of society be-
cause the conflicts may not be localized and solved separately. On 
the contrary, the transient nature of these conflicts creates new prob-
lems by creating the so-called “domino effect.” 
B. Religious Freedom and Religious Human Rights in Ukraine 
As to human rights, Ukraine has relatively good figures in the 
sphere of religious freedom and religious human rights. Ukraine, 
which is not “the best student” in the school of democracy for post-
Communist countries, has relatively decent standards in the sphere 
of religious freedom for four principal reasons. The first reason is the 
religious configuration of Ukraine. The second reason is the weak-
ness of Ukrainian nationalism and the lack of strict denominational 
identity, which does not allow the establishment of a religious mo-
nopoly. Ukrainian national myth is not really connected with relig-
ion. When we speak about the Ukrainian person, we do not mean 
the religious identity as we do when we speak about Poles, Serbs, 
Georgians, or Croatians. The third reason, which in my opinion is 
very important, is the type of religious culture. Because the essence 
of post-Communist religious changes is the restoration of religious 
cultural types that have been created over centuries and were de-
stroyed to a certain extent by Communist regimes, Ukrainian reli-
gious cultural types need to be considered separately. However, at 
the present time, the Ukrainian religious culture has a high level of 
tolerance toward other believers. The “Ukrainian Project,” which 
was largely based on the intentions of nineteenth century Galychyna 
thinkers who believed that the western Ukraine should not be Pol-
ish, Austrian, Russian, nor Muscovite but instead part of a great 
Ukrainian nation, meant the deliberate abstraction of religious dif-
ferences between Catholics and Orthodox. In his 1906 article, 
Ukraine and Galychina, Michailo Hrushevs’ky warned the compatri-
ots of the reoccurring danger of Serbs and Croats, religiously divided 
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nations which have arisen on the common ethnic base.35 The final 
reason is that religious freedom in Ukraine never threatened the gov-
ernment’s position as, for instance, the freedom of speech can. 
Respectively, the Ukrainian government had no reason to seek the 
destruction of religious freedom. 
C. Orthodox Churches and Human Rights Issues 
Obviously, the situation of religious human rights in Ukraine 
cannot be considered stable. One can ask how interested Ukrainian 
Orthodox people are with human rights issues. 
By reviewing the materials of Bishops Councils and Synods of 
Ukrainian Orthodox churches; All-Church Meetings and Confer-
ences; interviews with church leaders by mass media; various state-
ments, approvals, and reports of meetings with Ukrainian political 
leaders, one can roughly create the following structure of concerns. 
First, some significant problems are the issues of returning facilities 
and properties to the church, of loosening the tax burden, of pre-
venting the possible privatization of former church properties, and of 
creating advantages for getting humanitarian aid. 
A second concern is the providing of a more qualified presence in 
different social spheres, where the social service needs to be accom-
panied with apostolic service and where the church has access to or-
ganized and very important social institutions—schools and the mili-
tary. 
Finally, the third issue, where the church’s concern with the af-
fairs of the state and society is obvious, is the issue of competitive ac-
tivities of other religious organizations, both new and nontraditional 
for Ukraine. These organizations are founded overseas or are simply 
Orthodox churches of different jurisdictions. The sphere of human 
rights and freedoms is not the center of concern. Among a few 
church statements is found an initiative of the leaders of UOCMP 
regarding amnesty for prisoners due to the two thousand-year anni-
versary of Jesus’ birth and the speech of the late UAOC primate 
Dimitry against the delay of salary payments. 
In fact, in recent years, the only mass movement for the right not 
to pay taxes, a right not to aggravate one’s personal conscience by 
“Caesar’s” demand, was the refusal of about fifty-thousand faithful 
 
 35. Michailo Hrushevs’ky, Ukraine and Galychina, in 36 LITERATURNO-NAUKOVIJ 
VISTNIK (1906).  
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followers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriar-
chate to have individual identification codes. In this case, the theo-
logical basis of the problem and its social-church status were not 
considered. It is quite indicative that the UOCMP, having regained a 
voice after seventy years of silence, focused on the idea of not accept-
ing identification codes, yet did not consider expressing its position 
regarding the main social problems or evaluating the events and 
processes which had changed living conditions and put people in the 
position of moral choice. This fact suggests the social marginaliza-
tion of the Church. 
Once again in Ukrainian history, the government faced believers 
determined to suffer rather than accept the government burden be-
cause of ideas that the believers considered ontologically important. 
Characteristically, the majority of officials considered these ideas to 
be senseless. Finally, the government was forced to provide the be-
lievers with a softer alternative. This incident is a very important 
precedent in modern Ukrainian history. 
D. Attitudes of the Orthodox Clergy Toward Human  
Rights Issues: The Case of Ukraine 
The relation of Orthodox churches toward religious freedom 
problems and human rights issues still has not been determined. 
During the year 2000, I surveyed ninety-four Orthodox priests of all 
three jurisdictions in seven Ukrainian regions. My survey proceeded 
as a standard interview, lasting sometimes for two hours and cover-
ing the whole range of problems. Some of my results are listed be-
low:36 
 
Which of the statements do you agree with? 
 
• Individual human rights are more important than state and 
society interests—25.5% 
• State and society interests are more important than individual 
human rights—67% 
• Private property is a natural and inalienable individual right—
47.8% 
 
 36. Included in these percentages are those who answered, “I absolutely agree,” and, “I 
disagree.” Those who answered, “I agree and disagree,” “No response,” or, “I am not sure,” 
are not included. 
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• Private property is the source of sin, wars, and hatred—38.3% 
• The death penalty is not allowed in any circumstance—11.7% 
• The death penalty in some cases is needed—82.9% 
• Equality is more important than freedom—52.1% 
• Freedom is more important than equality—45.7% 
• Religious freedom can be limited only in cases where its mani-
festation threatens life, health, and freedoms of other peo-
ple—18.1% 
• Preaching of false teachings is not religious freedom and needs 
to be limited—75.5% 
• Democracy for Ukraine is an untimely issue—30.9% 
• Ukraine suffers from a lack of democracy—51.1% 
• Freedom of mass media is very important to me—9.6% 
• Freedom of mass media is not very important to me—88.3% 
• Order in the country is more important than freedom—61.7% 
• Freedom is more important than order in the country—38.3% 
 
The interviews with Orthodox clergy show that the most painful 
problem for the Orthodox mentality is the protection of collective 
identity. In fact, in each interview the concern about the loss of Or-
thodox identity was expressed. In the western Ukraine, the priests 
see the source of this problem as the work of the Ukrainian Greek 
Catholic and Roman Catholic Churches, but in the eastern Ukraine, 
the priests see the source of this problem as the work of western mis-
sionaries and new religious movements. 
In general, the persons who were interviewed tended to empha-
size duties more than rights. They also insisted on the necessity to 
eliminate religious freedoms for religions that are nontraditional in 
Ukraine and to prohibit such religious groups that, in their opinion, 
are “sects” or “cults.” Approximately 70% of all who were inter-
viewed think that the Ukrainian legal system is too liberal and does 
not contain mechanisms of protection against the so-called “totali-
tarian sects.” More than half of them think that it is necessary to re-
consider the Ukrainian system of church-state relations. 
E. Religious Intolerance 
The interreligion conflicts of the past now remain the principal 
source of religious intolerance in contemporary Ukraine. The strug-
gle was accompanied by skirmishes both among the believers of dif-
ferent churches and between believers and militia detachments in a 
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number of populated localities in western Ukraine. In this region, 
the situation was particularly grave in 1989–1991. Afterward, a cer-
tain normalization process occurred (though the process was much 
slower than expected by the Ukrainian society). 
The Ukrainian state explicitly manifested religious intolerance 
when former President Leonid Kravchuk rendered unilateral assis-
tance to one of the churches in conflict—the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. The fact that most of the religious 
institutions have their centers outside of Ukraine is a particular con-
cern for the newly established Ukrainian state, particularly for the 
former presidential administration of L. Kravchuk. Immediately fol-
lowing the declaration of Ukrainian independence, this administra-
tion took measures to block the influence of the Moscow Patriar-
chate, which from the perspective of national interests was viewed as 
the least desirable foreign religious center. The government, in turn, 
assisted the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in its desire to establish 
complete canonical independence. This attempt, however, was car-
ried out in the absence of adequate political, canonical, and juridical 
expertise and without taking into account the given sociocultural and 
sociophsychological context. Many criticized this policy in fear that 
the policy might result in the foundation of an established church. 
President Leonid Kuchma, elected in 1994, recognized this policy to 
be wrong and one that contradicted the law and interests of Ukraine. 
The simultaneous existence of several centers of religious influ-
ence in Ukraine does not allow any church to completely dominate 
and to suppress religious minorities, as happens quite often in a 
number of the post-Communist countries. Nevertheless, separate 
cases of intolerance manifested by the local authorities toward reli-
gious minorities in Ukraine were documented. One of the most well-
known of these cases was the decision of the Chervonograd City 
Council in 1993 in the Lviv region to prohibit Jehovah’s Witnesses 
activity on city territory. This decision was abolished by the public 
prosecutor of the Lviv region as unlawful. 
F. Politicization of Religious Life 
The next problem that has had a serious impact on church-state 
relations is the abnormal politicization of the churches. In Ukraine, 
where the national idea has not yet become the value common to all 
and where there is significant diversity in the cultural orientations of 
different regions, religious institutions occupy a special position. On 
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the background of an undeveloped party system and weak trade-
unions, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church exists as a deeply stratified 
structure, a reliable system of communication and well adjusted over 
the centuries, possessing the means of transplanting quite sophisti-
cated ideas into the fabric of ordinary consciousness. These features 
make the Ukrainian Orthodox Church exceptionally attractive for 
persons and groups striving to acquire or preserve positions of 
power. 
The representatives of the post-Communist elite view the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a means of political or ethnic mobili-
zation, as an instrument through which to legitimate their regime or 
to transmit certain ideas. Nearly no one looks at the Ukrainian Or-
thodox Church as what it should be: a specific spiritual phenome-
non. This statement is not meant to be an accusation but simply a 
statement of objective reality. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, on 
the other hand, is altering the social composition of the country in 
its own specific fashion, which is very different from the way that lay 
institutions approach this matter. Arnold Toynbee once wrote that 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church accomplishes social transformation 
through the “spiritual progress of individual souls.”37 Neither the 
government nor society at large is ready to accept the Ukrainian Or-
thodox Church in a role of moral arbitrator, or even a moral oppo-
nent, that steadfastly uncovers social disorders and causes consider-
able embarrassment for the powers that be. 
At the same time, religion in Ukraine very largely functions as a 
means of political, cultural, and ethnic mobilization. We can speak 
about the presence of a quite definite correlation between a declara-
tion of belonging to some particular Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
and political preference and behavior. 
The 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine 
were particularly illustrative in this context. Given the fact that in 
Ukraine several religions are, in effect, competing with each other, 
these elections, indeed, helped create a situation in which the various 
churches are being transformed into parties. 
And at last, the general problems of development of the post-
Soviet societies—that is the legal nihilism of the population, the con-
tradictions between the branches of authority, the corruption, and 
the attempts of the political elite to use churches as a tool for the re-
 
 37. 2 ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 80 (1957). 
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alization of their own projects—have appeared to be the most serious 
obstacle in the process of overcoming the Communist heritage in the 
sphere of church-state relations. 
G. The Ukrainian Government’s Church Policy 
The Ukrainian government, de jure, has its own policy concern-
ing religious organizations and the faithful. This policy, at the very 
least, was legalized in Article 30 of the Ukrainian Law, “On the 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations.”38 However, 
the precise meaning of this policy has yet to be determined. More-
over, it is still too early to speak about a single governmental policy 
in Ukraine. This policy, on the one hand, is a result of the way that 
larger issues are decided in the competition between various inter-
ested political forces and in the internecine struggles between com-
peting governmental structures. On the other hand, the policy 
emerges in the struggle between the various religious institutions in 
their desire to place people into positions of power, which they find 
convenient. This policy constantly vacillates between trying to pre-
serve a positive liberal image and secure guaranteed liberties, and the 
attempt to preserve the most dependable control of the state over re-
ligious organizations and to secure greater latitude and possibilities 
of influence over the church. 
VI. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 
In these conditions, Ukraine, however, has managed to achieve 
very essential successes in providing religious freedom. We should, 
evidently, agree with those researchers who consider the achievement 
in this area as the most serious of all the post-Communist changes in 
Ukraine. 
A. The 1991 Law: Main Provisions 
In April 1991, the Ukrainian parliament accepted the Law “On 
the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” (“1991 
Law”), which mainly follows the stipulations of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, as well as other European Conventions. In many aspects, the 
Ukrainian model of church-state relations turned out to be more 
 
 38. UKR. CONST. ch. 2, art. 30 (1996). 
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similar to the American model than to the European ones: the 
Ukrainian model includes the principle of church non-establishment, 
the strict separation of church from state and state from church, and 
the equality of all the religions before the law. Seri Plokhy has argued 
that, even though Ukraine’s geographic location would seem to dic-
tate a European form of church-state relations, Ukraine’s choice of 
the American version of church-state relations makes sense because 
Ukraine, like America, was established by colonization with an “ad-
vancing frontier” mentality. Thereto, the 1991 Law provides that 
when an international treaty, the signatory of which is Ukraine, es-
tablishes norms other than those which are stipulated by the Ukrain-
ian legislation on freedom of conscience, then the norms of the in-
ternational treaty apply. In accordance with Article 18, Paragraph 3 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) as well as with Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the European 
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, the 1991 Law introduces only those restrictions which are 
necessary to maintain public order and safety, lives, health, and mor-
als as well as rights and freedoms of other citizens. At the same time, 
the Ukrainian law establishes a broader frame of religious liberty as 
compared with ICCPR Article 18, Paragraph 1. While ICCPR de-
fines two meanings of the right of thought, conscience, and religion, 
namely the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his or 
her choice, and the freedom to manifest religion in different man-
ners, then the 1991 Law introduces two more meanings of this free-
dom, namely, the rights to change religions or convictions and to 
expand not only religious but also atheistic convictions. 
The Ukrainian legislation does not establish differences in the le-
gal status of religious organizations of different confessions, does not 
create a division of the religious organizations on the basis of tradi-
tional and nontraditional ones, does not establish any trial period for 
a religious community to obtain the status of a legal entity, does not 
limit the right to create a religious organization to the citizens of 
Ukraine, and does not provide that only Ukrainian citizens can be 
leaders of churches.39 
 
 39. However, the amendment enacted in 1993 does distinguish between the religious 
freedoms of citizens and foreigners. Foreign citizens who are temporarily in the Ukraine may 
preach or practice their religious activities “only in those religious organizations on whose invi-
tations they came, and upon an official agreement with the state body which has registered the 
statute of the corresponding religious organization.” Amended Ukrainian Act, HANDBOOK OF 
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At the same time, the Ukrainian legislation does differentiate be-
tween the legal status of religious organizations and the legal status 
of public organizations. Religious organizations are formed primarily 
to satisfy religious needs and to facilitate the expression of religious 
feelings. Religious organizations do not participate in the activity of 
political parties, do not conduct propaganda during election cam-
paigns, and do not finance candidates of the bodies of state author-
ity.40 Article 5 of the 1991 Law obliges the state bodies to take into 
account the canonical structure of churches. 
The state also has an obligation to overcome the negative church 
policy of the previous regime; the state has not accepted such an ob-
ligation with respect to the political parties. The state eliminated the 
problem of the legalization of religious organizations, recognizing 
them to be legal already on the basis of the mere fact of their crea-
tion (notice to the bodies of authority is not obligatory). 
At the same time, as in many post-Communist countries, 
Ukrainian law is marked by the spirit of statism. The state appropri-
ates for itself numerous functions unusual for democratic states. For 
instance, according to the law, the state should defend religious or-
ganizations’ rights and interests that are legitimate and should en-
courage tolerance among both the religious and the atheist. 
B. Registration System for Religious Organizations 
To receive legal entity status, the religious organization registers 
its charter. The registration of the charter automatically confers legal 
entity status on the religious organization. To register its charter, the 
religious community must have at least ten members. Religious 
communities must register at the regional office; religious centers, 
monasteries, theological schools, missions, and brotherhoods must 
register at the Ukrainian State Committee for Religious Affairs. The 
registration procedure is rather simple. The registration of a religious 
organization’s charter, unlike the charters of political parties and 
public organizations, is performed free of charge. 
 
THE COUNCIL FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, art. 24 (1993); see also Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and 
the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 
315. 
 40. See UKR. CONST. ch. 1, art. 5 (1996). 
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C. Financial Condition of Religious Organizations 
The system of church-state relations in Ukraine separates the 
church and state in a rather strict manner. The state provides no fi-
nancial subsidies—neither direct nor indirect—to religious organiza-
tions. However, the state considers itself to be obliged to compen-
sate churches for the enormous damage that they suffered from 1917 
to 1985. At the time of the Communist regime and during the Nazi 
invasion of Ukraine, approximately 14,500 church buildings were 
destroyed or used for non-religious purposes. Over the past five 
years, more than 3000 church buildings have been returned to reli-
gious organizations, and the government has authorized the return 
of 150 more buildings in response to pleas from churches. Neverthe-
less, only 65% of the religious communities of Ukraine presently have 
temples, mosques, synagogues, or prayer houses. For this reason, 
3500 lots have been allocated, without charge, to religious organiza-
tions for the construction of church buildings. The government has 
extended this privilege not only to the traditional churches but also 
to religious organizations that have appeared in Ukraine in recent 
years. 
D. The Problem of Returning Church Property 
Nevertheless, the problem of returning property to churches re-
mains one of the most difficult ones in church-state relations. First, 
the state has not been able to return more than 100 church buildings 
that are now used as museums, picture galleries, hospitals, schools, 
and other establishments of culture and education, which presently 
do not have other locations to which to move. Furthermore, prob-
lems arise where two or more religious communities, which were 
formally one religious community, claim rights in the same building. 
Local authorities have shown certain biases in handling such situa-
tions. During the last year, the courts have considered forty-four 
cases of religious organizations concerning the decisions of state 
bodies on property issues. In eighteen cases—that is, in more than 
40% of the cases—the decisions of the local authorities were recog-
nized to be invalid and the courts allowed the appeals of the religious 
organizations. 
Finally, at the present time the state is only trying to solve the 
problem of returning buildings and property used for worship to the 
religious organizations. However, the Recommendation of the Par-
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liament Assembly of the Council of Europe concerning the accep-
tance of Ukraine to the Council of Europe (1995) expresses the ne-
cessity of a legal solution to problems dealing with the return of all 
church property, not just that part of it which is used for worship 
purposes. A presidential decree provides favorable conditions for so-
lution to this problem but preliminary work is only in its initial 
stage.41 
E. Attempts to Reconsider the New Ukrainian  
System of Church-State Relations 
At the beginning of the formation of the model for church-state 
relations in the independent Ukraine, opponents attempted to tor-
pedo this model. The opponents of the existing model, which fully 
complies with the international legal acts to which Ukraine is a signa-
tory, were fighting and are continuing to fight for the following po-
sitions: 
 
1. Ukraine is not a country of emigrants; it has a millennial 
Christian tradition. An exceptional role in the formation of this tradi-
tion is attributed to Orthodoxy and Greek-Catholicism. Therefore, 
the Orthodox Church and Greek-Catholic Church have the right to 
receive a special status. 
2. The historical churches of Ukraine were extremely weakened 
by the Communist regime; therefore, they are not capable of com-
peting with the foreign religious institutions and missions, which are 
well organized and have powerful financial support. Thus, the his-
torical churches have the right to receive legally established privi-
leges. 
3. A sharp increase in the number of religious organizations cre-
ated by foreign missionaries may lead to a radical change in the reli-
gious map of Ukraine, resulting in a loss of Ukrainian originality.42 
Therefore, a reliable legislative barrier must be erected to the expan-
sion of “foreign religions.” 
4. The religious situation in Ukraine has a very peculiar feature: 
the religious organizations have the highest rating of the people’s 
 
 41. Presidential Decree, On Urgent Measures for Combating the Negative Consequences of 
Totalitarian Policies of the Former Soviet Union Regarding Religion and Restoration of the 
Violated Rights of Churches and Religious Organizations (March 21, 2002). 
 42. See Stahnke, supra note 39, at 314. 
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confidence. They have a real influence on the political behavior of 
citizens. Yet, the majority of the religious organizations have their 
church administrative centers beyond the borders of Ukraine. One of 
the biggest churches in Ukraine (38% of all the communities offi-
cially registered) is under the jurisdiction of Moscow Patriarchate, 
which has no sympathy to Ukrainian independence and statehood. 
Under these circumstances, the state must intervene actively into re-
ligious affairs, giving special support to those churches that are help-
ing the Ukrainian people in establishing the young Ukrainian state in 
its national rebirth. Furthermore, the state must influence, in a 
proper way, those churches that do not take part in these processes. 
5. In many European countries, there exist the established 
churches and distinctions in the status of religious organizations of 
different confessions. This fact does not prevent these countries from 
being members of the Council of Europe and from having an es-
teemed reputation on human rights and religious liberties. 
 
The hierarchy of the historical churches is the group that is espe-
cially persistent in its efforts to impose restrictions and even prohibi-
tions on the activity of foreign missionaries. In fact, one of the main 
goals of many church administrations has become the opposition to 
foreign missionaries and the appealing to the state machinery for 
help in this struggle with them.43 
The arguments mentioned above seem to be reasonable if one 
does not take into consideration the country’s political and cultural 
context as well as the level of Ukrainian officials’ legal conscience. In 
the given conditions, only a direct prohibition against establishing 
any advantages or restrictions of one religion in relation to others 
can more or less effectively curb the discrimination against religious 
minorities. 
The anticult movement, which demands special legislation for 
regulating the activity of new religious movements, strongly insists 
on making changes in the Ukrainian model of church-state relations. 
In contrast to the western anticult movement, this movement in 
Ukraine is not as strongly “institutionalized.” However, the move-
ment is based on the support (at least the moral support) of a signifi-
cant part of the population and the church hierarchy. A wide spec-
trum of the political parties, from the left to the right, support this 
 
 43. See id. at 313. 
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movement, as do some officials who hope to unite the historical 
churches on the basis “of the threats from the sects.” 
The Amendment to Article 24 of the 1991 Law, adopted on De-
cember 23, 1993, is one of the most serious concessions to the 
forces striving to change the new Ukrainian model of church-state 
relations. This amendment was adopted one month after the attempt 
of “The White Brotherhood” to seize the Sophia Cathedral in Kiev 
and while a strong anticult wave existed in society. The public opin-
ion was so highly excited that society showed practically no reaction 
to the obvious failure of this amendment to place any limitation on 
the misuse of religion to the detriment of the health and life of the 
citizens. 
The Amendment to Article 24 of the 1991 Law stated: 
Clergymen, preachers of religion, instructors (teachers) and other 
representatives of foreign organizations who are foreign citizens 
temporarily staying in Ukraine, may preach religious dogmas, per-
form religious rites and practice other canonic activities only in 
those religious organizations on whose invitations they came, and 
upon an official agreement with the state body which has registered 
the statute of the corresponding religious organization.44 
It is evident that such an Amendment was in contradiction with 
the fundamental principles of the Ukrainian legislation on freedom 
of conscience. This amendment attracted severe criticism both in 
Ukraine and abroad.45 
In a report on religious freedom, the U.S. State Department 
made the reasonable claim that the 1993 Amendment restricts the 
activities of non-native religious organizations and that, “[i]n addi-
tion, local officials have occasionally impeded the activities of foreign 
religious workers.”46 Yet in 1994, after the amendment had been in-
troduced, Ukraine remained the more favorable place of foreign mis-
 
 44. Amended Ukrainian Act, HANDBOOK OF THE COUNCIL FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, 
art. 24 (1993); see also Howard L. Biddulph, Religious Liberty and the Ukrainian State: Na-
tionalism Versus Equal Protection, 1995 BYU L. REV. 321, 339 (quoting the 1993 Amend-
ment to Article 24). 
 45. See COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY IN THE OSCE: PRESENT AND FUTURE 37–50 (1999) (briefing of the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe held Sept. 27, 1995); Biddulph, supra note 44, at 339–
41. 
 46. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES POLICIES IN SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM: FOCUS ON CHRISTIANS, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/ 
970722_relig_rpt_christian.html (July 27, 1997). 
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sionaries among all post-Communist countries.47 
F. The 1996 Ukrainian Constitution 
The discussions concerning the system of church-state relations 
also affected work on the Constitution of Ukraine, which was 
adopted in June 1996. Some political parties and movements, such 
as the Project of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, submitted 
to the constitution’s drafters a proposal for a cardinal revision of the 
system that already existed. Nevertheless, the Constitution states that 
“no religion can be recognized by the state as an obligatory relig-
ion.”48 The Constitution separates church and state as well as school 
and church. The Constitution asserts that the right to freedom of re-
ligion may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary to protect public order, health, morals, or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.49 In addition, the Con-
stitution provides that the state will promote the development of 
ethnic, cultural, language, and religious originality of the national 
minorities.50 Part 2 of Article 35 of the Ukrainian Constitution pro-
vides for substitution of mandatory military duty by an alternative 
service.51 
Thus, the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine has consolidated the 
model of church-state relations that was formed on the basis of the 
1991 Law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the course of recent years, a new system of church-state rela-
tions has been formed in Ukraine; this system complies with the in-
ternational legal acts to which the Ukrainian state is a signatory. The 
gravest problems in church-state relations in Ukraine are the follow-
ing: (a) the multilateral, interchurch conflict that makes the process 
of harmonizing relations between the churches and the state compli-
 
 47. In 1994, 1113 foreign Protestant missionaries worked in Ukraine, as compared with 
505 in Russia, 213 in Hungary, 182 in Albania, 165 in Romania, 87 in Czech Republic, 77 in 
Bulgaria, 77 in Poland, 53 in Serbia, and 45 in Estonia. See East-West Church and Ministry 
Report 2, no. 1. 
 48. UKR. CONST. ch 2, art. 35 (1996). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. art. 1. 
 51. Law of Ukraine on Alternative Service (adopted May 1992). 
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cated; (b) the absence of carefully developed mechanisms for the re-
alization of legislation on freedom of conscience (this absence is a 
consequence of the under development of the legal base in the 
Ukrainian state); and (c) the return of property taken from churches 
by the Soviet regime and the inefficient executive bodies that prevent 
the strict implementation of the law in this area. 
The Constitution of 1996 has crystallized the existing system of 
church-state relations. However, there are quite powerful forces in 
Ukraine striving to revise the principles of this system. Russia’s ex-
ample will make, without fail, these forces more active in the near fu-
ture. 
The problems in the relations between the church and state can-
not be solved separately from the many other social and political 
problems existing in Ukraine. The solution to these problems is 
closely connected with the strengthening of the civil society and with 
the overcoming of the Communist heritage and post-Communist 
pathologies. 
 
